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HOW TO DETERMINE IF YOUR
FIRM IS TOP HEAVY
herrie ,\-fonmoco
Bnan H. Kleiner

Introduction
During the past se\en years, American corporations have demonstrated
a marked increase in the act1\I!) of ,treamlin111g management structure. If
one \\Cre to poll hne worl-ers, they would say that it i common knowledge
- there arc too man) managers Statistics tend to support this viewpoint.
Between 1977 and 1981, blue-collar employment increased by 2% while whitecollar emplo) ment soared b) J 2«ro (Green & Berry, 1985, p. 27). A study
of 200 companies conducted by Temple, Barker and Sloane, Inc., showed
that compame~ tended to ha\e one manager for every three to four employees
(Public Utilitie Fortnight!), 1985. p. 46). Adm1111strat1ve overhead accounted for as much as one-third of a firm's total payroll.
The preponderance of management 111 American corporations has become
a focal point stemm111g from the success of foreign competitors in the United States. In general, large l\merican firms 1aJ..e action too sluggishly because dec1s1011-mak111g occurs far from the problem source. Communications
through multiple layers of management result 111 distorted and rnaccurate
information Indeed, it \\as a rude awakening for Ford Motor Company to
comprehend that I! labored under twehc layers of management whereas competitor Toyota Corporation \\Orl-ed effecmel} wHh se\en ( iemtedt & \Vintermandel, 1985, p. 34). \\ hlle there 1s no magic number of management
layers that \\ orJ..s best for all, analyses of orgam1at1onal effect1veness and
orgamzational design can be 111itial steps 111 the determination of a top heavy
firm .

Organi1a1ional Effccthcnc,s
The field of organizational effectiveness has been fraught with c_onfusio_n
and amb1guit}. As each ne\\ model depicting organizational effect1venes 1s
presented, there 1s more controversy. Researchers find difficu lty'". iden1~f~111g generic effectiveness indicators, then have further problems 111 definitions and descnpt1onc;. Indicators are often 1111errelatcd and ynerg} frequently
occurs. This 111nucnce may not be captured in some models, but much of
the controvers} lies in the fact that one cannot compare apples to oranges.
Different models are useful in analyzing the performance of different types
of firms.
.
The multitude of models and theories is now perceived to fall 111to tw0
general classifications: the goal auainment ~ode!~ ~nd _systems models.
auainment models focus their auention on 1dent1f1cat1on of goals, P_ersp
nd
ll·ves a nd priorities Systems models examine a firm 's ability to survive a
'
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the method in which this is accomplished. In 1977, Campbell suggest
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-----------------------------criterion measures of organizational effectiveness should be developed so that
they can be used to compare organizations, evaluate effects of organizational development efforts, and determine what characteristics of an organization are significantly associated with organizational effectiveness as a basic
construct" (Lewis & Minton, 1986, p. 514). He presented a taxonomy of
criteria he felt summarized the models to date. He identified the critical variables as follows (Lewis et al., 1986, p. 519):

-overall effectiveness
-planning & goal setting
-value of human resource
-conflict/ cohesion
-nexibility / adaptation
-achievement emphasis
-role & norm congruence
-managerial interpersonal
skill
-participation & shared
values
-internalization of
organizational goal\

-productivity
-absenteeism
-job satisfaction
-motivation
-managerial task skill
-goal con en us
-readiness
-evaluations by external
entities
-mformauon management & communication
-training & development
emphasis

-efficiency
-accidents
-growth
-tu rnover
-morale
-stabi lit y
-control
-use of
em1ronment

In 1983, Qumn and Rohrbaugh built on organizational effectivene model
first developed by Scott, Seashore, and Cameron to create a" patial" model.
This is a highly integrated model demonstrating the interrelation of organizational value\ and method , management values, and tructural preference.
For example, the structural concepts of decentraltza11on and centralint ion
arc located on the upper and lo\, er pornons of the outer circle. In the center
core are the fo ur potential ends of result\ of a fi rm 's activities: productivityefficiency, s1ab1lity-cquilibrium, value and development of human resources,
and grO\\lh-rcsource acquisn1on. The comple\11} of thi model further supports the conclu ion that no one model can determine organizational effectiveness in a research setting.
While some organirntions st res tructure, sy. tern , and style 10 achieve
organiza11on effectiveness, others describe effectiveness m terms of productivity, job sa11sfaction, employee development, and communications. Both
vie" points arc consistent with the Qumn and Rohrbaugh spatial model.
Joseph R. 1010, an organizat ional development con ultant, belteve that the
true foc us of organizational effectiveness shou ld be on u ing all employee
to the fullest while achieving company goa ls. He describes eight characteristics, on a more pracucal level, that are essential for effective organizations.
H e believes that in mo t firms, organizational effectiveness e,pre es it elf
in the presence or ab ence and balance of the follo" ing eight factors: 1) purpo es and direction, 2) performance tandards, 3) reward and recognition,
4) participation and teamwork, 5) coordination and cooperation, 6) formal
su pport system , 7) human resource development, and 8) relationship to the
external environment (Toto, 1986, p. 35).
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Management and employees must first have a strong sense of purpose and
d1rect1on. The mission statement of the firm 1s expressed clearly but, more
importantly, it is communicated, understood, and accepted by all employees.
In a large communica11ons company focusmg on internauonal expansion,
a study conducted by Coopers and Lybrand revealed that 84% of the senior
management did not agree \\Ith the organizauon's goals (De Chambeau, 1987,
p. 55). Without the unity of leadership on goal\ as \\Cll as on management
philosophy, the firm loses control. A sign of top-heavy management is the
existence of bureaucran Anthon; DO\\ ns, a noted scholar on bureaucracy,
corned the phrase "law of d1m1nishmg control"; he theorizes that "the larger any organizauon become,, the \\ea!.,.cr is the control of its actions exermed b; those at the top" (Green ct al , 1985, p 26). Gordon Tullock suggests
that there 1s a 10% distortion factor as mlormat1on passes through each layer of management (Green ct al., 1985, p 50-1 ). Thus, 1f data travels through
five layers, then half of the information is lost, and the organization has
vvasted hall its effort.
To ensure organiLational effecmeness, goals must be translated into performance and performance must be measured against established expecta11ons - the performance standard Employees need guidelines in work
performance. The standards should ansv\er the ques11ons: What am I supposed to do? Ho\, am I domg? \\ hat do I ha\,e 10 do to improve? The
management consultant firm of Sl\1C Hendrick, Inc , conducted a study of
organiLauonal structures m 1979. It concluded that 75% of all corporate
management were underuuh,ed and that each manager could handle as many
as 17% more workers without bemg adversely affected ( ienstedt et al., 1985,
p. 34). In tall corporauons, there is a tendency toward redundancy because
the cham of command becomes so obscure This translates into costly inefficiencies, unchallenging performance standards, and reduced actualizauon of personal goals.
Once tandards are in place, 11 1s essen11al to maintain motivation by recogniling and rewarding good performance. This 1s generally accomplished
through dollars, human development, and peer distincuon. Agam, the increased emphasis on accountability m streamlined orga01Lational structures
results in higher risk for managers. Yet, success means greater peer distincuon and personal grov\lh. Some corporauons find more motivation through
pay for performance plans. Wnh the Hcml Company, managers can earn
30-50% over their annual salaries if net profits exceed projected targets (Green
et al., 1985, p. 20).
Participation and teamwork arc vnal to any successful organization. Ford
Motor Company helped soften the years of labor-management a nt ipathy by
aski ng workers fo r ideas. Employees felt more self-sa tisfaction a nd a sense
of contribution to a team while Ford was rewarded with improved efficiency fro m the employees (Green et al. , 1985, p. 21). A a conseq uence of multiple layers, ma nagers in a top heavy firm find di fficulty relating to employees
in the field. The nature of the structure causes them to become insulated,
a nd they even lose an understa nding of the consumer they serve.
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Coordination and cooperation are also key factors in the effectiveness of
a firm. The organizational structure is a starting place. If relationships are
ambiguous or blurred, important information can fall into a black hole. The
mission statement and organi,ational goals are the unifying elements. Top
heavy organizations have a way of diffusing responsibility. A frequently used
ploy is the consultant. In this way, no one in the corporation is to blame
if the wrong decision 1s made. But American firms that have begun reducing
the layered look of management have emphasized the essential function of
each manager's position while simultaneously raising each manager's level
of accountability. In addition, JOb descriptions have become broader. These
steps combine to build more nexibility, cooperauon, and coordination.
Even the most satisfied and productive workers need support and resources
to be continually effective on their jobs. \1any of these elements fall in the
mouvational class of Herzberg''> Two-factor Theory. On the personal side,
workers desire programs that provide assistance in day care, finance, mental health and fitness; but they also "ant an adequate support system in the
technical aspects of their work. It then appears ironic that in slimming dO\\n
the size of management, staff functions are usually the first to go. When
Philip Morris acquired General foods, it was announced that the 2,000 headquarter Jobs would be trimmed to 1,000 (\1oore, 1987, p. 65). This strategy
1s to avoid wasting dollars on '>taff that contributes irregularly 10 produc11v1ty but, instead, to purchase information from consultants as needed.
The organi,a1ion must continually nurture its employee, through a human resource development plan so that there 1s a ready supply of qualified
people. In ,ome tall corporat10n'>, middle management has accounted for
up to one-third of the total employees. The bad ne\, s is that with management streamlining programs, the ranks of the middle will shrink. On the other
hand, those remaining will have more opportuniues tor personal gro\, th becau,e accountability is greater and the job de cripllon will have more versa11h1, .
The last of Toto's effectiveness factors 1s the firm's rela11onsh1p 10 the
environment. An effective organiLauon functions harmo111ously with its industry and the marl,.et that it <,erves. Bureaucracy, unfortunately, causes top
e,ecutives to lose touch with the marl,.et place. Xerox Corporauon totally
ignored the mes ages from the external environment. It wa<, happy to re t
its laurels on the perceived continued success of its 914 copier from 1970.
\1eam\ hile, the Japanese captured 21 cro of the lo\, priced marl,.et, and IBM
grabbed part of the e,pensive copier mari,.et. Xerox lo I sight of comumer
wants and, at the same time, personnel cost grew out of control. In 1981,
Xcro, started a reorganization project \,hich began \,ith the elimination of
12,500 employees, or about I0"'o of its wori,. force, in an effort to nauen
out the corporate structure (Green et al., 1985, p. 35-6). Xerox ha yet to
come close to recovering the 800Jo market share they once held.
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Organizational Design
Organizational design, simply put, refers to the predetermined method
managers have selected to achieve the firm's goals. The manager utilizes the
organizational structure to stipulate how tasks are allocated and the chain
of command. This encompa ses the concepts of complexity, formalization,
and centralization. With top heavy management, the difficulties mainly occur in the areas of complexity and centralizat1on. More \pecifically, vertical
differentiation and span of control are problem areas.
The vertical differentiation of a firm 1s defined by the number of hierarchical levels in an organization. While more le,els promote closer one-onone supervision and, therefore, helter control, it also causes a greater potential for information distortion, problems with coordinating decisions, and
more difficultie for top management 10 relate to activities at the line level.
Busine s firms re emble less chains of command than layer cakes with up
to 15 layers between CEO and the line worker (Green et al., 1985, p. 25-5).
It took two years of memo \Hiting at Proct0r and Gamble company to get
through to decision makers so that the Jar '>IZes of Folger's instant coffee
could be authorized (Green ct al., 1985, p. 33-4). Excess1,e ,ertical differentiation can be more costly than in Just lost opportunities. When Motorola,
Inc., decided to embark on a restructuring project, one di,ision identified
an unnecessary layer of production supervision amounting tO several hundred
employees. The annual projected savings when all posit1om are phased out
are estimated at S5 mil hon ( ienstedt et al., 1985, p. 39).
Span of control quantifies the number of '>Ubordinate'> a manager can effectively direct. Smaller spans usually result in taller organizational structures and arc often coupled with the term centraliLallon. The po'>llivc aspect
is that there 1s closer upen1sion with a more boss-controlled environment.
However, one trades off for the increased problems in communication and
coordination. The difference between a span of four and eight in a company
of four thousand, nonmanagenal employees can re'>ult in two entire layers
of management of eight hundred more employees. Lester ThurO\\ of 11T
blame much of America's competitive problems on our insistence on running things "Lone Ranger" style. He says that "the best managers have to
1-.no,, e,erything, have to be on top of every decision. The successful manager
is the one who makes the most decisions" (Semich, 1986, p. 49). MaJor corporations, however, are beginning to do more with le s. Le,,is W. Lehr, former Chairman and CEO of 3M, said that with the technology-based efficiency
improvements, namely computerizat1on, organizations can be managed more
effectively by fewer people (Priestly, 1984, p. 61). t Motorola, where the
recent emphasis has been on decentralization or increasing span of control,
the process began wnh having each top manager of a section draw on one
sheet of paper all personnel positions and their relationships 10 each other.
It became apparent that effective spans were dependent on the nature of the
section's function. For example, in fina nce it was typical to have spans of
one over two or one manager with two subordinates, but in production, the
span was eight. Although unique, each section was able to increase span of
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control while still maintaining effectiveness. At the same time, layers of
ma nagement were reduced.

The Ten Telltale Traits
A freq uent a nd deadly effect of a narrow span of control and severe vertical differentiation is bureaucracy. In The Challenge of Hidden Profit!.: Reducing Corporate Burea ucraq and Waste, authors Mark Green and John F. Berr,
summa rize their findings from interviews of over 400 business executives,
management consultants, labor officials, public officials, government regulators, workers, and scholars. They define "corpocracy" as waste in the corporate bureaucracy, and they believe it occurs for three reasons. First, the
lack of com petition allows firms lo become lax instead of progressive. Second, middle management is insecure and finds afety in numbers by surrounding itself with an entourage of staff. With narro,, spans of control,
middle managers only have part of a job and need to fi nd busy work to make
themselves look as though the, are real!; efficient. Third, American executives have an inherent belief that "bigger I better." Toda,, ,,ith U.S. firms
under pressure from foreign competitors, bigger may not be better, especially if "bigger" ha\ lost touch with its consumers and has become too slo,,
to respond. Green and Berry identify the Ten Telltale Traits of corporate
bureaucracy, and they lend themselves well to determining the !Op hea,iness
of a firm (Green & Berry, 1985, p. 12-25). They also have commonalities
\\llh Tot0's eight effecmeness characteristics.
I. Corpocrac) is insensith e to emplo) ees. \\'hen corporate headquarters
are physically remote from operating sites, it is easy for decision-maker to
forget about the workers. And "hile the computer 1s an invaluable and timesaving tool, an employee doe<, not like to be thought of a\ a computer file
number. The Japanese management s,stem has strucl.. the fancy of man,
American e,ecutives. One of the foundations 111 the Japanese Philo oph;
1s the vie\\p01nt of the employee as a member of a corporate family. The
participat1ve concept of Qualit, Circles has often been thought of as the cornerst0ne lo the Japanese success. In using this approach, the Japanese wor1..er ha gamed a sense of contribution, commument, and shared corporate
goals.
2. Corpocracy encourages politics instead of producthit) . E-..ecuth es create
subclasses of people by u ing and perpetuating status symbols such as
prinleged parl..ing space and e,ecuu,e d111111g rooms. Liu le producti, it> is
achieved when executives try to outmaneuver one another for the best and
biggest office. When politicking occurs at the very top, re ults can be devastating to the entire firm. In the earl, 1980's, the struggle bet\\een the two top
executives of Leh man Brothers Kuehn Loeb disrupted the powerful Wall
Street firm. Even a fte r o ne execut ive fina lly won , the company could n't
recover and profits sagged . Four years later, nei ther executive was ,,ith the
fi rm (Green et al., 1985, p. 29-30).
3. Corpocraey fosters secrecy and stitlcs communication. A certai n amount
o f gamesmansh ip results when many layers of ma nagement exist. Secret be-
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come tools for power. A middle manager wants to stand out fro m the crowd.
Transactional loss occurs when information stops at several levels. Managerial
discretion is used to alter or interpret information. Ed Carlson, ex-UAL
Chairman, calls this the "hourglass theory." He characterizes middle management as having little functionality beyond "make work" activities such as
clogging idea movement through the organizational structure in both directions (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. 313). It becomes predictable that data
will be embellished to renect favorably on the middle manager (Green et al.,
1985, p. 50-51 ).
4. Corpocrac) produce paralysis by papernork. A firm described in In
earch of Excellence required the interaction of 223 organizational unit linkages before a "Go" or "No-Go" decision was made for every new product
(Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. I 7). The proltferation of data causes sensory
overload. Opportunities are lost because tall corporations have committees
that generate more reports. Relevant facts needed for the decision become
lost in a nood of paper.
5. Corpocracy forgets markets. The most appropriate and damaging example of this trait is the story of Atan. Pac-Man was the biggest selling home
,ideo game of its time. But while the Atari people gloated on past success,
they failed to keep one ear to,,ard the marketplace. l\s profits fell, executives were replaced and more management layers \\ere added. In the end,
profits never improved, and Warner Communications sold off the Atari division (Green et al., 1985, p. 35).
6. Corpocracy diffu e responsibility . Top-hea\} firms have a tendency
toward low levels of accountability. The t\\O fa\ored tools are the use of
consultants and reliance on committees. Dec1s1ons have a \\ay of going around
in an endless circle. A CPA at Occidental Petroleum discovered that two
departments were spending lavish(, on two ver} similar proJects. For months
she tried to have one dropped but nothing happened. In the end both died
natura l deaths at the combined cost of$ I million (Green ct al., 1985, p. 36).
7. Corpocracy produce ~hort-term thi nkers. This trait 1s vic,\ed by CEO's
as one of the maJor weaknesses of today's corporate management (Prie tly,
I984, p. 62). Bureaucracies often pursue quick gains at the sake of long-term
prosperity and resort to hiding debt from investors. In 1980, A\IS used the
gimmick of creating a trust for the purpose of stashing debt. This move
prevented $400 million of borrowed money from appearing on the balance
sheet (Green et al., 1985, p. 39).
8. Corpocracy is habit-fo rming. A bureaucracy is not the type of environment that breeds innovation. It is simply less risk} to remain at status quo.
From the experience of Xerox and Atari, opportunity escapes as the ritual
of milking cash cows continues. Some large corporations even do it to themselves. A subsidiary shipyard of Bethlehem Steel was in the habit of purchasing its steel from the parent corporation for $460 a ton. It was a surprise
to learn that the shipyard's competitor paid only $31 Oa ton from the same
Bethlehem Steel (Green et al., 1985, p. 40).
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9. Corpocracy hates boat rocke rs. Hand in hand with the habit-forming
belief goes the avoidance of people who don't conform. The "good old boys"
syndrome is prevalent among bureaucracies. AT&T has undertaken one of
the most massive reorganizations in history to create smaller and more accountable SBU's (Priestley, 1984, p. 62). Yet, early on in the transition, William F. Buehler, then an SBU vice president, found himself transferred to
an obscure planning position even though his efforts made profits rise. He
rocked the corporate boat by making decisions that took Bell years to make,
and he mingled with the workers (Green et al., 1985, p. 41).
10. Corpocracy spawns isolation. The larger the corporation, the more
susceptible it is to the problem of isolation. In O n a Clear Day Yo u Can See
General Motors, John A. DeLorean describes the isolated splendor of GM
headquarters high on the 14th noor. It is ironic that those who make the
decisions may not drive cars - they are probably chau11eur driven (Green
et al., 1985, p. 46). It is hoped that the decision makers received accurate
reports from their subordinates.
Conclusion
Corporate executives seem to have an affinity for numbers. Unfortunately, when determining the top heaviness of a firm, there a re few quantitative
figures to use in decision-making. Consultants John P. Conley and Keith
Oratz have devised a concept to a nalyze the appropriateness of any organizational structure. The idea is called MOM or Minimum Organization Methodology and is built upon seven principles. First, the structure must be logical.
Next, the structure must support effecti,e and timely decision making. Third,
control mechanisms must be functionally justifiable. Fourth, the structure
must be supportive yet compatible with individual growth. Fifth, nexibility
must be built in to the system. Sixth, the use of committees must be defined,
limited, and responsible. Finally, the structure must be renec1ive of the firm'
unique characteristic (Conley & Oratz, 1986, p. 11 ). These principles tie
together ideas from organizational effectiveness models and the traits of
bureaucracy and help to diagnose the suitability of an organizational de ign.
The analysis begins only with the complete support of top management. Questionnaires are administered to all levels of managemem folio,, ed by interviews. Relationsh ips between work groups are studied with an eye on span
of control. Problem-solving groups identify specific goals and objectives.
Then they arrive at the minimum organizational structure required for their
achievement. Whe n the complexities of a large organization are unravelled,
one may discover more than just a few troublesome inconsistencies. Perhaps
it may not be such a bad idea to call "MOM."
Bibliography
Cameron , K. S. "A Study of Organizational Effectiveness and lls Predictors," Management cicnce 32, no. I (1986): 87-112.

45

Conley, J. P. and K. Oratz. " How ' MOM ' Would Do It; Doctors Become
Managers," Management Review 76, no. 10 (1986): 11 -13.
De Chambeau, F. A. "Keeping the Corporate Tall Ship Anoat," Across the
Board, XXIV, no. 3 (1987): 54-56.
Green, M. and J.F. Berry. The Challenge of Hidden Profih: Reducing Corporate Bureaucraq and Wa te. e\\ York, .\.: \\illiam Morro\v and
Company, Inc. 1985.
Lewis, A. Y. and J. W. Minton. '' Determ111111g Organi1ation Effectiveness,"
Management cience 32, no. 3 (1986): 514-538.
Nienstedt, P. and P. Wintermandel. "Restructurmg Orgamza11on for Improved Productivity: A case in point," Pcn,onnel 62, no. 8 ( 1985): 34-40.
Peter, T.J. and R.H . Waterman, Jr. In earch of h.cellence.
Warner Communica11ons, 1984.

e\\ York:

Priestley, C. " Management eeds Streamlining," Purchasing 96, no 2 (1984):
61- 65.

Robbins, S.P. Organizational fheor) (2nd ed.). [ngle\\OOd Chff,
tice Hall, Inc., 1987.
Sem1ch, J.R. "Viewpoint: Our Real Compet111ve Problem
:--.1anagement," Purcha ing 100, no. 2 (1986). 49

.J.: Pren-

Unproductive

Ta,ker. "Goodbye, Corporate Staff," Fortune 104, no. 24 ( 1987): 65-76.
Toto, J.R. "Vie\\point: Eight Characteri\tics of Organizational Effectiveness," Personnel J ournal 65, no. 5 ( 1986): 35-4 I.
"Corporate Bureaucracy and Produc11rny," Public Utilitic~ Fortnight!) 11 5,
no. 12: 46.
Sherrie Morimoto is Laborator; Operations Manager at Martin Luther Hospital, Anaheim, California. Brian H. Kleiner is Profes\or in the Department
of \il anagement, School of Business Admmiwat1on and Economic\ at
California State Univers1t, at Fullerton.

46

